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With the constant rise of new technology, developments in the fields of computer
science, wireless networks, storage capabilities and sensing possibilities along with
the demand for continuous connectivity have lead to the formation of the Internet
of Things (IoT) concept.
Today, there are numerous organizations working on the IoT technology aimed at
developing smart products and services. Each company proposes its own methods
directed for a particular field of industry thus, it ends up with having several
protocols. This has poorly followed the concept of a unified system. The Open
Group attempted to address this issue by proposing Open Messaging Interface
(O-MI) and Open Data Format (O-DF) protocols and claimed O-MI to be an
IoT messaging standard as that of HTTP for world-wide-web (WWW).
The proposed protocols have been designed to ensure robust development, data
standardization, and required security level. However, the security model needs to
be upgraded with the recent security techniques. This thesis attempts to specify
appropriate authentication and authorization (access control) mechanisms that
manage various consumers and provide functionalities that fit into O-MI/O-DF
standards. The thesis first discusses several challenges regarding IoT security
and then different authentication and authorization techniques available today.
It then describes in detail the design decisions and implementation technicalities
of the autonomous services created for the reference implementation of O-MI and
O-DF.
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DF, Security rules, Smart Devices
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter provides an introduction to the thesis research. It begins by
discussing the motivations for performing this work, then some background
information regarding the research topic and the relevant framework is pre-
sented. Finally, thesis structure is described.
1.1 Motivation
The beginning of the Internet started with the establishment of electronic
computers in 1950. ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency Net-
works), developed in 1969, is considered the basic foundation of the Internet
and the first network that utilized the TCP/IP (Transmission Control Pro-
tocol/Internet Protocol) protocol [38]. With the evolution in computer tech-
nology, several standards were adopted such as HTTP (Hypertext Transfer
Protocol) and HTML (Hypertext Markup language). This resulted in the
development of the World Wide Web (WWW) that linked HTML files with
the information systems which can be accessed by any device on the network.
Development of the Internet made the world smaller and the connection
easier. Over the past 23 years, the Internet has evolved to a great extent with
around 4000 million users [48]. Today, the mobile technology and the web has
changed the way in which people utilize the Internet. It is the primary path
that people follow to access all kinds of information, quick buying/selling,
fast communication, and instant entertainment. The technology is advancing
every day and is taking control of every small object in our society. As we
add more devices and information/data to the systems or on global networks,
more security risks are involved. For instance, using online stores for shopping
presents effortless opportunity to purchase any product in any part of the
world but at the same time, such online payment and banking systems are
8
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constantly utilizing many techniques to prevent the cyber attacks [31]. Not
only the bigger service provider firms but ordinary service users are also being
affected. Various methods utilized by attackers are SQL injection attack,
phishing attack, insider threat, and misuse of privileges and physical attacks.
Although education regarding cyber attacks is being imparted, currently,
cyber attackers have become very advanced and are adapting their ways to
the new security techniques and are attempting to make them inoperative.
In today’s world, researchers and practitioners around the globe have
given much attention to the IoT (Internet of things) technology. Internet
of things refers to the networked communication between everyday objects
and their users and as well as with other devices. Due to rapid progress in
technical research, IoT is aiming to provide exceptional opportunities to all
the apps that promise to achieve the quality of life [58].
IoT products will also be increasing in the coming years and thus, we
need to develop highly secure architectures. The security of such products
is of significant importance as they may contain personal, private and con-
fidential user/customer data. Therefore, more machines connected to the
Internet, more cyber threats will be involved. However, businesses today
have a fear of loss and consequently, provides as soon as possible the Mini-
mum Viable Product (MVP) to the market without taking into account the
product’s security aspects. Ransomware (a type of malware attack that locks
or encrypts the user files or systems and demands money in return) is also
one of the major threats for IoT devices.
1.2 Research Framework and Goals
IoT security is a broad and a complex topic. Several protocols and standards
have been developed so far as shown in figure 1.1 depicting the IoT protocol
landscape. It is becoming messier with every new device and is much more
dynamic when it is compared to the traditional web/Internet.
A number of protocols have been created and designed for particular use
cases. All these protocols have different requirements and characteristics and
are aimed to provide the best quality service in a specific field of industry.
This enables to develop efficient and one-shot applications. However, it does
not meet the vital requirement to have a unified IoT standard. Standard-
ization is the intelligible solution to the growth of the vertical market and
customized APIs. The goal is to achieve a seamless and perfect IoT de-
mands protocols to be efficient enough to be independent of the domain and
adapt themselves to various frameworks and models. An attempt was being
made by The Open Group to provide the solution for this problem (partly
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3. How to implement this solution and integrate it together in an applica-
tion along with the security aspects (authorization and authentication
modules)?
The above research queries were formulated due to the need for a gen-
eral standard that is highly required to fulfill all the specifications of the
Internet of Things. Additionally, a thorough analysis of O-MI and O-DF ref-
erence implementations is also essential. Therefore, a number of important
instructions that are described in this work are as follows:
• Analysis of the Background Topic: It includes the literature review
on the subject of the Internet of Things. It focuses on the introduction
of the IoT industry, its important aspects, and related issues. This
thesis formulates an analysis of various existing security mechanisms
and describes the requirements of the work in a procedural and under-
standable method.
• Study of the Reference Implementation: Along with the examples
of various use-cases, this study describes the O-MI and O-DF standards
reference implementation. It also discusses the current security tech-
niques being utilized and the urge to develop the authentication and
authorization (access control) mechanisms for the reference implemen-
tation.
• Design and development of Security Module Version 2: This
is the main area of the thesis which discusses the comprehensive proce-
dure of gathering requirements for security features, its design and the
implementation of the complete security model.
1.3 Thesis Structure
This thesis includes seven chapters. After the introduction chapter, the sec-
ond one discusses the Internet of Things subject in detail, describing the
requirements, related problems, and concerns. The third chapter analyzes
multiple authentication and authorization techniques that are accounted ap-
propriate in the Internet of Things scenario and pros/cons are being de-
scribed. In Chapter 4, The Open Group messaging protocols are being dis-
cussed in detail. O-MI and O-DF standards essential principles and design
concepts are presented. Chapter 5 describes the reference implementation of
O-MI and O-DF and represents the working of such protocols in a specific
app. Chapter 6 is the most important part of this thesis as it discusses vari-
ous authentication techniques, the requirements for O-MI node and security
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model, design, schemes, and implementation specifications. Finally, the last
chapter concludes this thesis by providing the summary of the findings, the
analysis of the research, and some future concerns in this work.
Chapter 2
Internet of Things (IoT)
2.1 Introduction to IoT
Internet of Things is also called as Internet of objects or Cyber-physical
systems (CPS) [58] [59]. Binding the physical bodies with the Internet has
shortened the distances and remote access to the sensors has been made possi-
ble. If the retrieved data is combined with the already available information
on our web services, then we are entering a totally new era of technology
where such services are provided to develop new kinds of products which
are far beyond those offered by the conventional “isolated” systems. The
new system called smart object is a CPS or an embedded system including a
physical device and a computing object that is capable of managing the data
from sensors and assists in establishing a wireless link with the Internet. For
instance, a smart refrigerator that takes notice of the expiry date of the items
and checks their availability periodically. Additionally, it places an order in
nearby shops for new products if they have reached their ending limits [44].
The concept behind the Internet of Things has first emerged in 2002 in a
publication [33] where this idea was named as intelligent products. Then in
2005 [59], this notion was referred to as the ”Internet of Things” since then
the world has visualized the usage of such smart objects. Communication
and interaction can take place not only among the people but also between
the humans and devices. Even device-to-device connectivity is also possible.
Thus, this can take the world to another higher level of intelligent systems
and distributed frameworks. Having abilities of action, connectivity, and sen-
sory, network-enabled smart devices have assisted a number of applications
in various areas of industries such as smart buildings, efficient transportation
systems, social communications, personal domains, and health centers [59].
Everything that we see around is going to be connected together such as as-
13
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sisted driving (cars, trams, buses and trains equipped with suitable sensors),
mobile ticketing (access transportation services via NFC tags), remote track-
ing of environmental parameters (monitoring of farms across several kilome-
ters) and intelligent maps (using NFC techniques). One can even consider
various sensors in one’s home and office, for instance, temperature, light, and
humidity sensor devices. IoT utilities can also serve us in industrial areas by
deploying RFID tags and enabling the automation of plants. IoT sensors can
also help us to know about the possible thefts, for example, if an object is
moved from its place without the user’s permission to some restricted zone
[22].
Several organizations have begun to launch various IoT services and de-
vices. The world has witnessed numerous headlines of IoT products acquisi-
tions, for example, Google bought Nest for about 3.2 billion dollars, Smart-
Things purchased by Samsung and Nest took over Dropcam [57]. Not only
the practitioners but also the politicians are acknowledging the importance of
IoT at an increasing extent in terms of business opportunities. IoT services
are modifying the behavior of the companies and the corresponding con-
sumers. According to some estimates, Internet of Things will progress worth
7.1 trillion dollars by the year 2020 [57] [49]. The figure 2.1 shows that the
world population would be approximately 7.6 billion in 2020 whereas there
will be a huge increase in IoT devices approximately 50 billion products, far
more than the 25 billion IoT items produced in the year 2015 [32]. Accord-
ing to a survey data which represents the interests of the organizations for
IoT products, around 15 trillion dollars will be invested in developing IoT
services between the years 2017 to 2025 [49].
Given that there will be more IoT devices in the year 2018, we have seen
a decline in terms of the cost of various IoT components. There are now
low-priced sensors available, bandwidth cost decreased to 40x and processing
power has reduced to about 60X in the past 10 years [39] where objects
are not merely connected with each other but also have the ability to act
smartly with the new generated or received information. Other drivers that
helped in popularizing the IoT technology are: smartphones that acts as
remote controllers of our devices (e.g., connected cars, homes, health care),
extended Wi-Fi coverage that is mostly free or provided at very low price,
developments in big data field as enormous data is expected to be generated
with IoT and the emerging use of IPv6 which can support 128 bit addresses
and translate to about 3.4 x1038 addresses far more than that of IPv4 (32
bit) that provides 4.3 billion addresses only [39].
Large-scale companies, such as Microsoft, IBM, Samsung, and Google,
have an immense influence on our lives and now have impacted substantially
the Internet of Things ecosystem. Such major businesses and tech giants pos-
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technology. This is now considered essential to have the similar open source
techniques for the Internet of Things, otherwise, the technical world would
continue to see the big tech giants progressing day by day without realizing
about the ecosystem fragmentation.
Today, several organizations realized the need for a standardized protocol
for all IoT objects and hence, they are working on such projects. One such
protocol is O-MI (Open Messaging Interface) and O-DF (Open Data Format)
standards produced by The Open Group. Further chapters will discuss them
in detail and will also describe the reference implementation working. Prior
to this, the current chapter will highlight some of the challenges and related
concerns in IoT and the importance of security in the Internet of Things.
2.2 Challenges and related concerns
All the objects that are bound with the Internet are expanding increasingly.
This led to the introduction of the IoT concept. The ecosystem of Inter-
net of Things is comprised of not only the smart devices (small physical
objects capable of communicating and computing with memory and energy
requirements) but also the identifying codes and labels that are utilized to
distinguish devices globally and uniquely. There are multiple technologies
that are currently serving these purposes such as LTE (Long Term Evolu-
tion), 6LoWPAN, WiFi Low power, RFID (Radio Frequency Identification),
NFC(Near Field Communication) and QR (Quick Response). As Internet
devices (appliances, tablets, laptops, and smartphones) are increasing, Inter-
net protocol IPv6 is being utilized in order to achieve distinguish address of
every object. Thus, increasing the possibilities of integration and end-to-end
connected society for the Internet of Things [40].
The technological challenges that the IoT industry is facing now are re-
lated to connectivity, standardization, security, and compatibility. Connect-
ing billions of devices in near future would be one of the difficult tasks and
it will challenge the present implementations of IoT structures. For the con-
nectivity of various objects, authentication, and authorization, many existing
systems depend on the client/server or centralized models which are consid-
ered suitable for a small number, i.e., 10s, or 100s or 1000s of nodes. However,
for larger numbers, these paradigms will become a bottleneck and would re-
quire massive cost investments to support servers to be able to handle a large
amount of data exchange and in an unfortunate scenario, a server failure can
turn down the whole system. A decentralized system of IoT can be one of
the solutions where critical tasks are handled on the edges while information
assembling process and computation to be done at the cloud servers level. A
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P2P (peer-to-peer) system having no brokers where machines identify each
other and deliver data; and utilizing mesh networks (which has reduced fail-
ures) can be some of the other solutions [30].
In order to process, store and maintain the information received from sen-
sor devices, protocols such as communication/network protocols and data-
gathering techniques are utilized. Relational databases are used for struc-
tured information and have a proper querying mechanism, for instance via
SQL whereas, for unstructured information, non-relational databases are uti-
lized that does not support a standardized way of querying. Another chal-
lenge faced for the standardization in IoT is to adopt the right technical
expertise to take full advantage of new upcoming data aggregation tools and
have the skills to layout, perform and handle the systems [23].
There are also the privacy challenges faced by IoT. Sometimes the infor-
mation gathered by an IoT object can be very sensitive and usually secured
by some legislation. However, it has been seen that appropriate steps are not
taken to avoid sharing the protected data with the other service providers.
This info should be scraped off or it should not associate any PII(Personal
Identifiable Information). The producers or vendors should take extra pre-
cautions of the user’s privacy. There can be a situation where insensitive
data from an object (for example, a smart fridge) can merge with informa-
tion from other appliances where there are chances of sensitive data leakage
[30]. Many issues emerge due to a lack of consciously using the IoT devices.
This is wide spreading in consumer appliances, for instance tracking gadgets
in cars, mobile devices and sometimes in TVs. If we consider the example
of a smart television, then there are chances that voice/vision recognition
sensors are embedded in the TV which continuously hear the conversations
around, can note down the user activities and then impart the info to the
backend cloud services that can be any third party involved. The assembling
of such data opens legal challenges against the information privacy and pro-
tection law. There can be many IoT situations that will include IoT objects
deployments and information gathering services globally and thus, there is a
need to cater such scenario by developing a broad IoT privacy model [23].
Internet of Things also suffers from a gateway problem. Portable devices
such as mobile phones, laptops, and tablets have achieved exceptional suc-
cess due to the wide wireless connectivity throughout the world. Cellular
and WiFi networks have enabled global access to the Internet applications
and cloud-based projects. Nowadays, we have seen small portable devices
that currently do not have worldwide access to the Internet and consists of
low-power batteries, having limited lifetimes and constrained wireless connec-
tivity (for example, BLE: Bluetooth Low Energy). Recently, such wearable
objects need to have an application specific to the device (iOS or Android
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based) that has to be installed on a mobile smartphone or on a laptop. When
we open a new browser or a new web tab, it is not needed to register a totally
new application on a wireless router. However, in the case of such an IoT
object, it requires to download and install a new application of a smart cell
phone, a dongle device or another base station. A new network architecture
was proposed that suggests to have an application layer gateway. This will
enable the information translation from the connection of low-power to the
Internet as a whole. This will provide application layer level connectivity in
hardware/software to all the Internet of Things objects [61].
As the Internet of Things techniques are rising in various fields where
several other technologies are being utilized and are attempting to be known
as the most optimal solution, it is producing many difficulties and necessi-
tates additional hardware/software deployment to communicate with differ-
ent nodes. In today’s world, IoT ecosystem is fragmented due to the reasons
such as products from different producers are unable to integrate; numerous
protocols for device-to-device communication and not a single one specified
as a standard; no programmability which is required for the object’s inter-
connection; variety of OS (operating systems) and firmware platforms; lack
of API testing that utilizes similar mechanisms and techniques; non-uniform
services of the cloud; objects using same interfaces are unable to push/pull
data; lack of protection for products using security software from a third
party and no availability of a common controlling and a monitoring tool to
manage the IoT objects. In the coming future, there is a possibility that few
of them may become outdated and this may cause an effect on the objects
utilizing these technologies, making them of no use. This is a critical issue
as IoT products, such as smart televisions or fridges, operate for a longer pe-
riod of times and should be able to provide the service even if the production
company and their techniques go obsolete [30]. In order to achieve a seamless
and smooth programmability of IoT appliances or sensor devices in a con-
nected world, interoperability is highly required. Horizontal platforms need
to be enabled that are functional and communicative across various sensors.
There is a requirement for standards. Interoperability is highly complicated
which can be made possible by utilizing the application layer that bridges the
technology to the layers beneath [52]. Side by side, the security techniques
must also be implemented at each layer of the protocol stack that supports
both the lower and upper layers. This feature is the focal point of the current
thesis and particularly, the security of the application layer.
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2.3 Importance of IoT security
Security is the prime focus of discussion in the Internet of Things market. IoT
industrialists are continually connecting every object (from small monitors
to automobiles) to the Internet and soon there will be more intense revenue
progress in IoT business. The data shared by people with IoT devices is often
confidential and they are bound to provide all the background information
and context perceptions in case of any change in their services. Small startups
strive for their share of the industry market and ignore the security aspects
of their products. This leads to Internet breakdown, identity theft, privacy
and data breaches. Security experts in the military consider IoT botnets
as weapons which can also stimulate DDOS (distributed denial of service)
attack [55]. In a large network of IoT devices, every single object of this
system can be the initial point of a cyber attack which can then spread
across the whole network. This is common in publicly deployed devices such
as bus stops. Although security techniques are employed, there are chances
of physical hacking attacks and as these objects are not the personal property
of anyone, it is difficult to protect them. We have witnessed such incidents
in the past, for example, the jeep hack where the jeep was hijacked over a
Sprint network and the attacker was able to modify the speed of the car
[18]. Hospital ventilation system was accessed by a hacker and he remotely
controlled the temperature and air/heating systems [51].
Having IoT feature is significantly cost sensitive. For adding smartness
to, for example, cars, buildings, and vending machines, the hardware part
must be economical. To attain this, only a limited amount of memory and
processing power is added that is enough to support the IoT property, with
having no facilities left to incorporate the conventional security products, for
instance, anti-virus or anti-spyware software. Such design structures have
faced cyber attacks in the past, for example, several inspection cameras,
digital video recorders, and other IoT supported objects were compromised
and a huge DDOS attack was executed [45]. Practitioners are also working
to add networking and other IT technology to such devices that originally
have not had them. Consequently, users have to use security patches (if they
even exist) periodically to keep them updated with new cyber techniques.
Those objects that are used at least a decade, have their security patches
released on and off. However, those devices (developed years ago) whose
vendors stop creating secure patches due to less financial incentives become
a serious threat to security. They provide backdoors to wrongdoers to their
applications and to the entire system as a whole [28].
The security risks are excessive in autonomous systems of IoT which con-
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siders no human interaction involved and only the devices connecting directly
with each other. Today there exist several such applications, for example,
Tesla introduced the autopilot feature which when turned on makes a ve-
hicle a self-driving car and works without any human touch behind, taking
assistance from the roadside implemented sensors [42]. If humans are not
keeping the track, there are security risks associated with it. Unmonitored
sensors can access sensitive information and if a malware gets installed then
it can spread across the entire networked system and may cause blackouts.
Even if a system involves human in the loop, unanticipated security breaches
occur. For instance, smart watches or fitness tracker wearables can be used
by a hacker to detect the hand movements of a person while he is typing a
password or a secret code to another device and recreate them. This is also
the example of backdoor access to conventional systems [53] [28]. Enormous
data is generated using such fitness apps such as they track a person’s heart-
beat rate, his gestures and overall performance. Such volume of data and its
scope can be of much value to the hackers as IoT sensors not only produce
them but also they interact with other devices and thus, transmit plenty of
information and data. Those companies who have produced a great number
of products that are constantly transferring and accepting data must be more
responsive towards the measures taken to incorporate security features. The
most traumatic situation would be when attackers hack the medically related
tools which can cause significant consequences on the health of the patient
[17].
It is commonly said to not trust the third parties. The reasons are mostly
that such an enterprise may misuse or sell a person’s information with the
wrong intention or there are also possibilities that a company may be fair
to a person but due to poor security measures gets hacked and important
information is lost. There are examples when even a government abused
individual’s confidential information or became the victim of such security
hack [17]. One kind of such incident happened recently in March 2018 in
Atlanta where the government systems became the victim of this attack. A
hacker group known as SamSam attacked city files, locked down the online
systems and services (that may be used to pay bills), and blocked Atlanta
to do any kind of court-related processing or warrants. SamSam demanded
$51,000 ransom in Bitcoin. This affected almost 6 million people and the
city’s IT department asked the employees to unplug their devices in case
of anything suspicious. Atlanta government called out Dell SecureWorks
security team and the city was able to recover some services [36]
According to the Gartner report, global IoT security spending will reach
1.5 billion dollars in 2018 which is 28 percent more of that experienced in
2017 (1.2 billion dollars). As IoT is becoming an integral part of our everyday
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life, it is estimated that by the year 2021 the money spending on security will
reach around 3.1 billion dollars [19]. By 2020, each person will possess five
devices and thus, have to divert our attention more towards minimizing the
vulnerabilities to information thefts and security attacks. The current secu-
rity mechanisms need to get updated. About 33% of the enterprises confirm
that their generated devices are immensely resilient and are able to protect
themselves against any future cyber attack. Around 48% of the organiza-
tions have started incorporating secure mechanisms from the very start of
the product development stages [17]. Security by design concept is utilized
where security is introduced at the start of the developing stage of a product
and not after the security breach incident. This has become important as
tech firms are increasingly creating new IoT products for consumers and as
each one of them has the ability to connect to the Internet, multiple vulnera-
bilities have to be taken care of. Tech companies have to find ways to secure
their systems from unwanted access, should inform their users about their
data collection and sharing schemes and should guide them about the usage
of a particular IoT device to avoid any kind of risky act [20].
Incidents discussed above might frighten people from utilizing IoT prod-
ucts and this might lead to the termination of the development in IoT indus-
try. Therefore, it is very important to divert our attention towards the se-
curity aspects of IoT features. Authentication, authorization, access control,
data storing schemes and privacy issues must be carefully designed according
to the latest security techniques available which are capable of avoiding any
kind of current hacking methods.
To summarize, there exist diverse Internet of Things security concerned
challenges. Few of them can be resolved to utilize the current security
methodologies. Otherwise, there is a need for thorough discussion and elab-
oration towards IoT secure technologies with close cooperation with users,
producers, software designers, and standardization organizations.
Chapter 3
Authentication and Authoriza-
tion
Security of the devices basically depends on two goals: a) to protect the ac-
cess to resources against the unaccredited person, and b) to make sure that
the authorized user has the appropriate rights and is able to access the sys-
tem. Authentication and authorization play a vital role to identify a person
and allow him specific access rights to a website or to a particular application.
Authentication: This methodology is adopted by a server where the server
analyzes who the person really is and exactly who is interested in accessing
its resources. This process is also utilized by a client where it needs to ex-
amine the system as it pretends to be. Furthermore, it is used by users to
identify themselves with such clients and servers. Authentication methods of
server necessitate username and password whereas other techniques could be
via cards, fingerprints, face/voice recognition and scans of the retina. Quite
often the authentication process by the client is through certificates which
are provided by the server to the client. In this process, a credible third
party claims that the particular server is a legitimate one and is in accord
with the entity it represents to the client. The authentication process, how-
ever, does not provide any information regarding what activities a user can
perform and what exactly the files on a system he can see. It solely takes
the responsibility of identifying an individual or a system [12].
Authorization: This technique is performed by the server where it examines
whether the client possesses required rules to get to its specific resources or
to some documents. Authentication and authorization processes go hand in
hand so that the authorizing server has the idea of the requesting client.
For the authorization, there may be different ways to authenticate a client;
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username/password can be one of the methodologies in some cases. There are
also scenarios where no authorization method is implemented. An individual
may directly use the documents or can simply ask for the permissions to
access particular resources. An example would be those websites on the
Internet that does not ask for any kind of authentication or authorization
process and a user can open them anywhere, anytime [12].
3.1 Authentication-Authorization Approaches
With the growth of a large amount of confidential data over the Internet,
the need to keep the hackers away accessing such information has risen.
Impersonation of identity has become an easy task to achieve. Therefore,
special authentication methods to assess a requesting individual’s identity
are required. Today there are several verification methods and protocols
that help to achieve this goal. Such techniques are described as follows.
3.1.1 One-Time Passwords (OTP)
Those enterprises that provide online facilities, also offer various-factor au-
thentication services to strengthen the security of their products. In such
scenarios, the system before authenticating a user, verify him using different
unions of various components. As a result, in case a component is invalid,
faulty or missing, that particular user will be rejected by the verification sys-
tem and will not be registered. There are several data hiding methodologies
introduced that secure the data during their transfer. Those techniques can
be adopted by tech organization to escalate security to avoid intrusions or
information thefts.
The one-time password is a password or pin code that is created auto-
matically and consists of the numeric or alphanumeric character string. It
validates an individual for one login session or transaction. To acquire OTP
technique by several projects, they make sure that it requires access to some-
thing an individual possesses (for example, a smartphone) and something an
individual has the knowledge of (for example, a pin code).
Mobile phone two-factor authentication (MPTFA) is one of the notable
multi-factor verification service [56]. In such systems, an individual is asked
to enter the data that he has registered in their service. After this, he re-
ceives an SMS, email or a message via any sort of application designed for
this purpose and is requested to enter a dynamically created one-time valid
password that is created by the server out of any combination of digits. It
also has limited or short interval expiry time associated with it. When it is
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expired, the individual has to enter his credentials again and a new one-time
valid password is requested. It is then created by the host machine and is
sent to that individual [25].
There can be some advantages and disadvantages of OTP and MPTFA which
are described below.
Advantages:
• OTP technique is easier to adopt in the verification systems.
• As compared to the static passwords, OTP is capable of avoiding the
replay attacks (an attack during the transmission of the data where the
data is sent again and again or is delayed maliciously.) In a situation
where an attacker gets hold of the one-time password, he will not be
able to misuse it because that OTP will already be utilized by the user
himself to log him in the system or to make any kind of transaction
and thus, will no longer remain authentic.
• There are cases when people tend to use the same password for several
applications. Therefore, when an intruder tries to get the password for
one of such applications, this will not make other systems vulnerable
as OTP is valid for one session only.
• In MPTFA, there is a limit on the number of wrong entries a user
can enter. When that limit is achieved, the user is no longer able to
access the application. This reduces the compromised data possibilities
caused by hit-and-trail attacks [25].
• As the passwords are short-lived and expire quickly, attackers are un-
able to utilize them in future to get access to some application.
Disadvantages:
• There can be social engineering attacks on such passwords where a
phishing (an illegal process to get access to the confidential information
by impersonating as an honest identity) entity deceives the users and
tricks them to impart some of their previous one-time passwords. The
untrustworthy entity can then analyze the pattern and will be able to
predict the type of OTP be generated in the future.
• One-time passwords can be in a way more secure than static ones. How-
ever, there can be man-in-the-middle attack and they are unprotected
against it.
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• The battery life of mobile phone and cell phone signals can affect the
reception of the messages containing the pin code or OTP [25].
• If the SIM registered for receiving the OTP or the phone itself pos-
sessing that SIM is lost then the user will not be able to login to his
specified applications due to incomplete login process [25].
• For MPTFA method, there are privacy concerns as the user has to
provide his phone number to such applications to send them OTP or
pin codes. There is always a risk that such applications can publicize
his number or share to other services [25].
3.1.2 Context-based Authentication (CBA)
This kind of authentication mechanism utilizes contextual data to ensure an
individual’s authenticity. In addition to other secure authentication tech-
niques, this mechanism is suggested to be utilized along. Enterprises looking
for efficient and strong authentication mechanisms should take into account
their customers, business proceedings, threats, and risks, and then choose an
optimal security method that is flexible enough to modify according to the
requirements. For instance, a company can utilize context-based authenti-
cation method to enable an authentication system that utilizes public key
infrastructure (PKI) technique such as digital signatures, FDE (full-disk en-
cryption) and a network login or plans to incorporate them in coming future
[9].
Organizations, utilizing CBA in their authentication systems, are contin-
uously increasing to support remote access to the workforces. CBA technique
provides stronger control of their worker’s machines where a thorough secure
procedure is designed that develops secure connectivity between devices and
the sensitive applications they utilize. CBA considers various factors to de-
velop trust and enhance security. Some of them are described as follows.
• Every machine that a user utilizes, for example, mobile phone, laptop,
tablet, and computer, is characterized, have a distinctive identity and
is linked with the particular user. Thus, device-specific authentication
is achieved [24].
• In order to implement two-factor secure method without any friction,
both the user’s login secrets and the device’s identification number
that is assigned to him are used by the context based authentication
system. Thus, supporting behind-the-scenes and transparent authenti-
cation technique [4].
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• Enterprises have defined trust tags for their devices and customers uti-
lizing their products. The purpose of trust tags is to label them as
they can be trusted always for any further interactions. In this way, an
individual is labeled as a valid user and does not have to go through
all the steps of authentication mechanism. Thus, he or the device will
be granted access instantly [4].
• Context-based technique also tracks the user activities and locations
and develops the legitimate data about it. Such information includes
login activities, the speed and the number of times of user login ef-
forts, languages used, number of devices and relevant configurations,
IP addresses, geographical locations and uncovers unexpected places or
points based on the recent data [4] [24].
• It highlights anomalies or viruses that have infected the registered de-
vice used for login or are someway involved in some fraudulent activity
[24].
3.1.3 Certificate-based Authentication
Digital certificates are used for authentication of the user, server, organization
or any entity and aim to achieve a secure connectivity. Certificates consist of
an important information, i.e., a public key to an identity that is in accord
with the private key. Similar to the personal identity card, passport or a
driving license, a certificate provides acknowledgeable proof of a user’s or
any entity’s ID. They can be kept on the client locally or on any kind of
portable device, e.g., a smart card.
There are trusted entities that perform the validation of the identity and
sign the certificates digitally by using its private key. Such a trusted body
is known as the certificate authority (CA). Certificates operate by declaring
the bearer’s identity by attaining a certificate signed by CA. CA can be an
organization introduced by the government; it can be a commercial company
or independent third party that provides its own certificate-issuing services,
and it can be internal to a specific enterprise. The techniques required to
verify an entity varies and relies on the rules defined by certificate authorities.
Usually, CAs use already formulated and published validation process, prior
to certificate issuing, to assure that a user/service asking for a certificate is
actually who it states to be [2].
A certificate provided by the CA associates the entity’s name with its
public key, for instance, the name of a server or an employee. Certificate
reduces the chances of impersonation attacks by the usage of forged public
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keys. Certificates can be transmitted freely anywhere as it has to be validated
for a specific user only with its private key combination. The certified public
key will only work with its corresponding private key that is linked to its
owner defined by the certificate [6] [2].
Additionally, certificates consist of subject’s name, CA’s name, certificate
validation period, serial number, revocation list, and other details. The most
significant part is CA’s signature that acts as ”letter of introduction” for
those individuals who are unaware of the entity certified by certificate but
have put trust in the CA. Furthermore, when the expiry date of the certificate
has reached, a new one must be requested. CA also has the authority to
revoke the issued certificate [2].
A software application of the client or the server that supports authenti-
cation via certificates keeps a set of all trusted certificates from CA. These
certificates can further determine other certificates which the application can
verify, i.e., what other certificate issuers an application can trust. The sim-
ple case would be an application authenticating only those certificates that
are issued by only one CA for which it possesses a certificate. There are
many cases where a certificate is part of a CA certificates chain. In this
chain hierarchy, every certificate is issued by the certificate authority above
it. The certificate-based authentication facility is part of the PKI (public key
infrastructure) and the standards are based on X.509 specifications for the
frequently used certificates [54] [2].
As they are stored on the client machine, certificates are considered to
be verifying the physical device and not the user himself. Today with the
advancement in technology, smart cards have been created that facilitates
the individuals to carry their electronic certificates and private keys along.
This has parted the device and the certificate. Analogous to the one-time
password method that utilizes a pin, using smart cards or certificates only,
fails to achieve two-factor authentication. This has been solved by using a
pin code to unlock the card and provides access to the specific user’s creden-
tials [6].
There can be pros and cons of using this method. Some of them are described
below [1].
Pros:
• Level of security is equal to or higher than the public-key authentication
method
• Using one location, an individual’s access to various servers can be
administered, an add-on to security in some cases.
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• Credentials used for authentication purposes can be revoked centrally.
• Users rely on CAs that help them by analyzing how trustworthy the
remote host is.
• It is a highly scalable process where there is no requirement for a sep-
arate entity rather only one CA or a limited number of them.
• Identity is verified only by the secret private keys.
• Certificates are utilized not only for login but also for the security of
e-mails and file servers access.
Cons:
• To get an SSL certificate can be costly.
• Every time a certificate expires, an updated one is required.
• There are also risks that CA are compromised by attackers.
• If there is an involvement of encryption/decryption of messages then it
becomes a slow process.
3.1.4 Biometric credential
Biometric does not focus on what a person possesses and what he has the
knowledge about instead it relies on what he is [6]. It is more secure than
using a smart card as it involves the usage of biological statistics which
states that the possibility of two persons having same biological features
(e.g. fingerprints) is very small or close to none. Therefore, such biological
characteristics can be utilized to authenticate a person positively and is hard
for attacher to falsify them.
Not only the fingerprints, iris, retinal, facial and voice patterns are unique
from person to person but can also be utilized for identification. Implemen-
tation of such methodology requires to have costly tools and equipment. Un-
like smart cards, a person does not have to carry it everywhere, his biological
traits are never left at home [54]. However, if biometric credentials such as
fingerprints are hacked by an attacker then it is not possible to modify the
biometric authentication.
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3.1.5 Single Sign-On (SSO)
Single sign-on is a session that is centralized and provides authentication
services for users where only one set of login data is utilized to get access to
various applications. In this way, the user is authenticated for all the appli-
cations to which he is authorized and further login prompts are eliminated
when he switches to other apps in the same session. Considering the back
end, single sign-on helps to track the user activities and logging accounts
of the users. SSO has solved the problem of users who do not remember
the passwords for various accounts where forgotten, unused accounts are at
security risks; and slow service access and inconvenience. Single sign-on is
usually implemented using lightweight directory protocol (LDAP) which is
described later in this chapter [8].
According to Network Applications Consortium, in large organizations,
people spend the average of 44 hours in a year on login activities for 4 apps.
The number of times people called for resetting their passwords was also
measured and it was 70% of the calls [29].
This SSO technique is beneficial for users and administrators as well.
They need to possess only one set of credentials that can be used at regular
intervals. This indirectly improves the productivity of the user. The au-
thentication framework only needs to monitor the modifications of a single
entry for each person in the database designated for credentials. One of the
main advantages is the centralized system of authentication data. Moreover,
the same methods and tools are utilized for access or any kind of change.
However, there is also a risk involved, i.e., if an attacker gets access to the
database and bypass the security system implemented, he can get hold of all
the information instantly.
The unvarying authentication scheme is enforced by centralization through-
out the organization which in turn is easier to protect as compared to the
distributed scenario. In the absence of SSO, users in order to remember their
passwords, write them down on their sticky notes or under their keyboards
which poses security threats.
An appropriate solution for SSO would be application or platform neu-
tral. This technique would cover/hide the implementation framework for
authentication on multiple OS platforms from the SSO users and can assist
to outsource the authentication method on application layer to authentica-
tion authority of centralized single sign-on. It is stated that SSO is a key
to the kingdom which means that if someone gets access to single sign-on
credentials then he can obtain all the protected resources. In order to min-
imize this threat, not knowledge based credentials should be used (where
knowledge-based credentials can be passwords). It is recommended to utilize
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possession based (e.g, smart cards, tokens) or biometric credentials. Using
multi-factor authentication techniques with SSO can further minimize the
security threats[29]. Some of the SSO protocols that are utilized today are
described as follows:
3.1.5.1 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
Security Assertion Markup Language is a standard that assists secure data
exchange. Produced by Organization for the Advancement of Structured
Information Standards (OASIS), it is a framework based on XML that is
used for the authentication and authorization purposes. It is a single sign-on
standard format. Electronically signed XML files are exchanged for authen-
tication purposes. SAML is a complicated SSO implementation that ensures
seamless and perfect user authentication between organizations and busi-
nesses.
There are three associated roles in SAML, i.e., end-user/principal, the ser-
vice provider (SP) and identity provider (IdP). IdP assists by providing on-
line resources that support authentication to the principals in the networked
environment. They are sometimes known as identity assertion providers or
identity service providers. SPs issue particular resources to the principals for
SSO. SP first establish trust with IdP for the user authentication. IdP, on
the other hand, creates an authentication assertion which represents that the
specific user has been identified and authenticated [50].
There are two kinds of SAML SSO flow which are described as follows:
• SP Initiated SSO: In this type of flow, principal or end user starts
performing the login process at the service provider. Service provider
redirects the principal to identity provider using a SAML request. This
SAML request will possess the required data needed by IdP to identify
the user and send the response to the service provider with correct
SAML assertion message, i.e., a SAML response. The SP initiated flow
is shown in figure 3.1.
• IdP Initiated SSO: In this type of flow, principal or end user starts
performing the login process at the identity provider. Identity provider
has to be configured with the service provider’s metadata (for instance,
Issuer, Assertion consumer URL and audiences). Identity provider will
dispatch response (SAML Assertion) to the service provider. The ser-
vice provider will validate it using the configured information. The IdP
initiated flow is shown in figure 3.2.
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resources, the owner shares the credentials with such apps that poses several
threats and issues: a) Third party applications saves the resource owner cre-
dentials for using them in future. This is conventionally a clear text password,
b) servers have to develop a password-based authentication system, although
the security threats against password-based authentication are quite obvious,
c) a broader access to protected resources provided to third-party applica-
tions as there are no limitations of time or any kind of access restrictions
to any resource type, d) in order to revoke access of a specific third-party
application, resource owners have to revoke access from all other third-party
applications. It is done by modifying the password of the third party, and e)
if in a case any third party secure mechanisms are hacked, this will result in
the compromise of the password and all related information that is secured
by using that password [37].
The solution to such problems is provided by OAuth that presented au-
thorization layer and parted client role from the owner of the resource. Using
OAuth, it introduced the different set of credentials (other than the ones
used by resource owners) for third-party applications to access the secured
resources maintained by owners and hosted by resources servers. Therefore,
instead of using the same information as that of resource owner, a client is
provided with access tokens. Access tokens are the strings that specify the
scope, validity period and other related properties. These are issued by an
authorization server only when approved by the resource owner. The client
uses access tokens to get to the access-restricted resource handled by the
resource server. For instance, a resource owner (end user) allows a client (let
us say printing service) to access his secured photographs that are saved on
a resource server (let it be some kind of a service for photo sharing) without
providing the client with username and password. The end user authenti-
cates himself with another server (authorization server) that is trusted by
the resource server and issues access token, i.e., client delegation specific
credentials [37].
There are four roles that are specified by OAuth [21]:
• Resource owner: An entity that allows access to the restricted re-
source. When this entity is a person, it is termed as an end user.
• Resource server: It is the server that hosts secured resources, has the
ability to accept and send responses to requests by utilizing the access
tokens.
• Client: It is an application that makes requests to the secured re-
sources on behalf of resource owners and with its authorization spec-
ifications. A client can be any sort of application on a desktop, on a
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3. Access token is requested by the client application by performing au-
thentication with authorization server and providing the authorization
grant.
4. If the client is authenticated by authorization server and if the autho-
rization grant is valid, an access token is being issued by authorization
server to the client application. Authorization is then complete.
5. Now access token is utilized by the client application to authenticate
himself with resource server and asks for the secured resources.
6. Resource server then checks the validity of the access token. If it is
valid then the client is granted with the resource he has requested for.
There can be pros and cons of using OAuth methodology. Some of them are
discussed as follows [35]:
Pros:
• OAuth has made it easier for people to sign up to the websites without
going into the hurdles of creating their own accounts from scratch. For
instance, a person wants to edit a file, whose link is shared to him by his
friend. He cannot edit the file until he has an account on that website.
Here the OAuth functionality comes in. The website may support ”Sign
up with XYZ account”. So considering that person already has XYZ
account, can log in using its credentials, access the file and edit it.
• Consequently, OAuth is time-saving. If multiple sites support OAuth,
then a person can access all of them using only one account.
• With OAuth, a user has the privacy of his confidential data. For in-
stance, online shopping can be done with OAuth login to an online
bank account, without letting the site know about the private bank
details.
• It is a secure mechanism that utilizes secure socket layer (SSL) for
protected communication.
• With OAuth, users have the ability to restrict the time frame to access
their information. The expiry time of the authorization tokens can be
chosen by the user.
• This methodology reduces the expenses that are spent due to licensing
fees for businesses. It is an open standard and can utilize multiple
online sites without any kind of association fee.
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• Websites can retain their users using OAuth as the user does not have
to go through all the efforts of creating an account and joining the
community.
Cons:
• There can be phishing attacks where a reliable looking website may ask
an individual for his credentials and will have his data phished.
• An attacker get access to all the applications that a user has logged in
by using an application (e.g., Facebook) by hacking that user’s Face-
book account which is used to authenticate the user.
• There are chances that obtained data can be misused. Recently, there
is an example of Facebook that has been guilty of such a procedure.
3.1.5.3 OpenID
OpenID protocol is a protocol that utilizes already existing account to log
in to a service without any need to make new credentials. It is an HTTP
based protocol and utilizes identity providers for user validation. It supports
SP-initiated SSO flow. The word ”open” means that any entity can be an
identity provider, a user has the choice to choose an identity provider and
is able to work on any sort of web browser without the need of patented
software [13].
OpenID is the authentication protocol. End-user first chooses OpenID
identity provider (e.g., Google) and gets an OpenID account. He then uses
this account to register at any relying party (a website) that allows authen-
tication via OpenID. The end-user then authenticates himself to the relying
party with the assistance of an identity provider. It provides a communica-
tion model between the identity provider and the relying party [46].
Let us take an example of a person crossing a border. If a person (end
user) is from Canada (identity provider) and wants to enter to USA (relying
party), he needs to show his identity at passport control. As the government
of the USA trusts the government of Canada to correctly provide identi-
fication for their people, the USA government will consider that person’s
passport a reliable one and will allow the person to cross. This scenario
works as the end user has provided his identification from an entity that is
trusted by the relying party [46].
OpenID is simple, easier to use and shifts trust from various parties to
one. However, there are some threats included: a) phishing attack where
compromised relying party directs user with a foul identity provider that
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asks him to enter his credentials. In this way, relying party gets access to
user account with identity provider and can use his account to sign in to other
sites, b) a hacked OpenID account is more dangerous regarding the privacy
breach than the one on a single website, c) this procedure lacks privacy as
identity provider has the log of OpenID logins and can easily do cross-site
tracking, and d) in case the communication is not secured, authentication
can be hacked [7].
Today OpenID connect has been introduced (created in early 2014) and
over a billion of OpenID connect accounts can be seen on the Internet. En-
terprises such as Yahoo, Google, PayPal, and WordPress involves OpenID
connect for user authentication. OAuth2 is the basis for OpenID connect
where OpenID is used for authentication on the top of OAuth2 which is used
for authorization. Thus, providing a complete security package [46].
3.1.6 Active Directory (AD)
Considering the computer network, a directory is utilized for two purposes:
1) To save information and organize objects data on the network, and 2) To
discover the location and fetch the data regarding network objects from the
storage of the information. Standards covering the entire industry to allow
interoperability functionality between multiple computer OS were created
[3].
Active directory is one such directory which was initiated by Microsoft
Windows 2000 server. It was considered the fundamental part of server OS.
It was upgraded in windows 2003 server. There are two main functionalities
that Active Directory supports: a) AD saves information regarding comput-
ers, the users, their groups and other related data of the network, and b) AD
allows clients to access data from the storage required for the authentication
and authorization purposes [16].
The AD consists of a hierarchical organization of forests, sites, domains,
OUs (organizational units), users, group of the users and accounts on the
computers, thus storing the data regarding objects in the network. Not
only the user, group and computer accounts, network objects also involve
applications, printers, servers, network shared folders and security rules that
defines allow/deny access of the users/computers or any kind of entity present
in the network structure. Similar to other directory services, the AD also
shares its stored data with the authorized entities such as admins, registered
applications and allowed users.
One of the methods utilized by the Active directory to make secure the
identity of the network entities is by handling the authentication during login
and managing authorization rights to the resources of the network. The AD
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is structured in a way that it has the ability to verify the identity of the user
and allow/deny the access to the protected resources for computer users that
is runnable on windows OS and also other operating systems [3].
The services provided by the Active directory to the entire network are
briefly described as follows: a) Active directory runs on domain controllers
for windows servers (2000 and 2003). A domain controller is the one that
manages directory information (such as security rules and authentication
info) domain-wide and handle interactions of the user domain, b) Active
directory global catalog has the copy of all objects in an AD but an only
small subset of attributes. It is used for searching functionality and locat-
ing copied objects, c) LDAP saves user accounts in a central database and
supports authentication/authorization functionalities. AD supports LDAP
v2 & v3 and for windows based network behaves as LDAP directory service,
d) Kerberos (version 5 supported by the AD) is a highly secure method for
authentication login and authenticated network service. It asks its users to
login only one time and are not disturbed again for adding credentials, e)
GPO (Group policy objects) contains group policy configurations that allow
admins to apply policies, thus controlling all objects, f) AD can be integrated
with DNS (Domain Name System) to locate domain controllers, with busi-
ness applications such as SQL server and IIS (Internet Information Services
and with other services such as remote access and certificate services, and g)
AD enables clients from different OS and that use different directory services
for interoperability [16] [3].
3.1.6.1 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
LDAP presents a secure method for authenticating users and assess the au-
thorized policies for that individual to access resources. A client/server pro-
tocol drafted for sending requests to directory services and changing required
information in the directory storage. Platform independent LDAP is TCP/IP
based IETF standard. It defines a communication protocol between LDAP
servers and clients and shifts the details about the server implementation to
the ones who create LDAP objects. It works in a way that client requests
to connect to the LDAP server, when it is connected sends a query, gets the
answer for his query and lastly, it ends the connection with the server.
LDAP specifies the query method to already present directories, ways to
refer to the objects in the directory, description of the object’s properties
and the security characteristics that define access control for the objects in
the directory. LDAP is the updated version of X.500 DAP (Directory Access
Protocol) and saves data in a hierarchical manner where it forms a tree-like
structure of different entities. Every entity has attributes and every attribute
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has some specific values. Domain Name System (DNS) can be used by LDAP
for the entities at the top level and can utilize entries depicting objects at
lower levels such as printers, users and groups [3] [5].
LDAP has the power to extend to add new functionalities and maintaining
compatibility at the backend smoothly. Many prime directory services have
adopted LDAP standard. Two examples of LDAP directory are windows
based AD and UNIX based iPlanet [3].
LDAP is comparable to a relational database, however, it does not possess
some of its features. It deals with the reading of attribute-based descriptive
information and is not usually modified. The ldapseacrh tool is utilized by
UNIX systems for reading purposes. This tool can also be compiled for win-
dows system where it is used for searching and displaying the objects of the
AD [3].
There exists four fundamental component models of LDAP. Each one of them
is described as follows [3]:
• Information Model: In order to represent an attribute of the entry,
there needs some information regarding the data type and the data
structure. The properties and features linked with the entry are spec-
ified in the object classes of the entry. The statements explaining the
attributes and object classes are defined in the schema. LDAP demands
an ability to use values of the attributes to search for the particular
entries.
• Naming Model: The way reference to the entry should be made is
defined by the naming model. The structure of LDAP consists of a
hierarchical tree that is known as DIT (Directory Information Tree).
DIT consists of nodes that represents an entry. Each node has the
ability to save data and serve as a container for further entries. To
provide a reference to entries, two methods are specified for this pur-
pose. Either a DN (distinguished name) of the entry can be used or
RDN (a relative distinguished name) can be taken into account. DN is
considered distinctive globally whereas relative distinguished name is
unique inside a directory.
• Functional Model: Functional model is considered as the LDAP pro-
tocol itself. It defines the ways in which the client of the directory can
interact with the directory. It supports three operations: a) searching
entries within the directory, b) adding, removing, modifying or upgrad-
ing directory entries, and c) authentication procedure to the directory.
It is also known as bind operation.
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• Security Model: The security model of LDAP defines authentication
methods for the directory and specifies authorization procedures of the
user access control towards directory. LDAP security model consists of
two fundamental components
– Authentication Component: Authentication in LDAP is per-
formed by binding the client to the server of the LDAP. If the
client’s input credentials are correct then the client is accepted
otherwise rejected. Successful bind leads to the successful authen-
tication of the client and unsuccessful bind specifies unauthenti-
cated client.
– Access Control Component When the authentication of the
entity is completed, the entity is allowed to access the LDAP di-
rectory only according to the specified ACL (access control list).
Every object in the network comprises of an access control list that
defines client/user accounts, various groups, and devices such as
computers that are accessible to him or are denied using from him.
The details how we have utilized LDAP and OAuth2 are described in the
further chapters.
Chapter 4
Open Group Messaging Proto-
cols
4.1 Introduction
The Open Group is a global board that aims at achieving business goals
of the organizations or individuals via IT standards. It manages over 600
enterprise memberships that involve users, academics, system and solution
suppliers, consultants, integrators and tool vendors [10]. The IoT Work
Group formed under The Open Group provided a comprehensible vision for
the standardization of the protocols: The way web Internet utilizes HTTP
protocol for transferring HTML-based data that is rendered in web browsers
for user consumption, in the same manner, Internet of Things will utilize
O-DF based information structure that is mainly developed for automated
consumption by IT systems [11]. To put it in another way, O-MI/O-DF
standards will offer connectivity functionalities between various things in
the surroundings to the Internet and will allow quick integration of such
links with the organization’s systems and network, making it looks like it is
produced by only one vendor. There exist techniques that manufacturers use
to get the data from their systems at regular intervals to have the knowledge
about their services and internal processes all along the life of a product. This
is done for maintenance purposes and to make the systems more secure and
reliable at the expense of low cost. It is also performed for keeping the note of
a product’s production phases, for instance, the condition of the machine or
energy consumption measurement. The gathered information can be utilized
for analysis and assists in managing further development costs, enhancing
the production processes and quality of the end product. This chapter will
discuss Open Messaging Interface (O-MI) and Open Data Format (O-DF)
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URL mapping scheme. This assists the user to make requests using par-
ticular URLs that involves the identity of the element or the name of the
feature. For example, the XML response shown in figure 4.2 can be re-
quested using the UNIX ”wget” utility: wget <URL>/REST/Objects. If
a user wants to request the information from SmartHouse only then: wget
<URL>/REST/Objects/SmartHouse or if he wants to set or read the tem-
perature of the bedroom then: wget <URL>/REST/Objects/SmartHouse
/BedRoom/Temperature. The response must have all necessary attributes
or sub-elements. It can also have additional sub-elements and attributes
defined.
To summarize, O-DF was created with the aim of expressing the data
regarding multiple different machines using a common method and that is
not dependent on the context or the application. The transfer of the data
in the network is not related to the O-DF technique. The data encoded
using this standard can be communicated using several existing low-level
protocols. The other option is to copy them in a USB storing device and
manually transfer them to the other system. The fundamental objective of
O-DF is to use it with the open messaging interface i.e., O-MI for requesting
and as the structure for the response [14]. The Open Messaging Interface
(O-MI) is explained as follows.
4.3 Open Messaging Interface (O-MI)
O-MI has the similar aim as that of HTTP for the web Internet. With the
usage of Open Messaging Interface, multiple sensors and machines can com-
municate with one another. For the lifecycle concept in IoT, O-MI must
assist in the interaction between various objects and other IT distributed
systems that utilize/provide data instantaneously that is related to the ob-
ject’s lifecycle. As the concept of “things” introduced by IoT specifies it as
anything in the surroundings, O-MI is designed to incorporate all of them.
Therefore, O-MI has been defined in a most possible generic way. In spite
of the focus on the lifecycle of the product, it should be possible to apply
this IoT standard, i.e., O-MI to the lifecycles of everything (for instance,
e-documents, services, and humans). The transportation of the payloads can
be done using O-MI in almost any kind of format that will exchange the data
among various O-MI nodes in a network. The data can be encoded using
XML (which is considered the common way for text-based payload structure)
and other formats such as CSV and JSON are also considered [15].
A fundamental property of O-MI is that it does not consider the prede-
fined roles of its nodes and the communication is based on “peer-to-peer” in-
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teraction model where each node can act both as a “client” and as a “server”
with the other O-MI nodes or IT systems. Thus, interacting directly with
one another and also with the servers at the back-end. The examples of
information exchanged are new info availability notification, sensor readings,
modifications in existing information, lifecycle or alarm events and queries
for the past data [15].
Below are the eight fundamental functional requirements that are needed
to have a scalable solution to all the IoT wide systems. The already present
methodologies in the market are specified for a certain field of view and
consequently, a considerable amount of amendments or extensions would be
required to modify them for the other use cases. Therefore, a generalized
solution was proposed that is scalable and tries to incorporate all IoT devices.
The O-MI important features and requirements are explained below [15].
1. O-MI should have the capability to transfer the messages by utilizing
the defined “low-level” protocols. Not only the network protocols such
as SMTP, HTTP, and SOAP, O-MI can also transmit the data by
copy/pasting them to and from USB sticks or any other kind of storage
media. Sending the O-MI messages via texts on a mobile phone can
also be done.
2. There are three defined basic functions, i.e., read, write and cancel.
Read is used for querying the data and immediate retrieval of it. It is
also used for deferred retrieval, i.e., for subscriptions. Write operation
is used for writing the information from the IoT devices to the O-MI
nodes. Cancel functionality is used to cancel out the subscriptions
before their expiry time. The “Delete” function is under development
phase which when applied will be able to delete O-DF objects and
Infoitems.
• Immediate read: When O-MI nodes request about a specific
value of an Infoitem at a specific time or at the current time, they
should be responded to immediately.
• Deferred read: It is also called subscription where the read re-
quest is stated with interval rates and a callback URL that can
be optional. When a user makes a deferred/subscription request,
he will then receive the required information according to the in-
tervals stated. The information will be sent to the callback URL
as specified. In a case when no callback URL is defined, the infor-
mation is retrieved i.e., “polled”. This is done by issuing a read
request in which the ID of the subscription is specified (that a user
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gets as a response when he requests for subscription). Polling is
beneficial in cases when the system uses NAT or firewalls that
prohibit responses to link with callback URLs.
3. O-MI nodes need to send as quickly as possible any sort of data (whether
current or historical) that becomes available to other O-MI nodes when
they request them. This has to be done at any time.
4. It should enable different formats for payloads that are used in both
requests and responses. Any kind of text-based formats such as pro-
prietary and standardized can be utilized to transmit O-MI message
information and such format can be embedded into XML as a payload.
5. There must be Time-to-Live (TTL) defined. TTL specifies the time
interval in which a particular message is valid that can be transmitted,
forwarded or is being replied back. If a message TTL has reached its
expiry time, it needs to be removed and an error message should be
generated that is returned back to the message initiator.
6. A synchronous interaction with O-MI nodes should be enabled. Any
kind of response message can have a request message specified in it
without having to send a completely new request message in an addi-
tional query. This creates possibilities to initiate a connection with the
nodes that are situated behind NAT or firewalls.
7. Data services, information resources, and metadata discovery and pub-
lications can be done utilizing the “write” operation. Simple RESTFUL
URL based queries such as HTTP GET or search engines can be used
(along with “read” requests) to discover such information. There can
be different formats from various resources and services. The format
specification is the part of format standards such as O-DF and not the
O-MI.
8. There can be a set of O-MI target nodes that are specified in the re-
quests. The nodes that receive the messages have to forward the request
to the defined target O-MI nodes or in case of any failure, must issue
an error message to the node that has requested.
To summarize, Open Messaging Interface is a method for sending mes-
sages among the nodes in a general way possible. This mechanism can be
utilized for various types of data such as files, document repositories, and
even physical objects. It not only specifies read/write operations but also
offers a subscription tool that enables information delivery when requested
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when some modification is seen or after a particular defined time interval.
Subscription is considered as the fundamental notion of O-MI.
Chapter 5
Reference Implementation Mod-
ules
5.1 Introduction
A proper documentation has become a vital part of the newly developed
technology and standards. In order to have a complete understanding of
the standards, it is beneficial to link them with a sandbox application and
reference implementation. With reference implementation, every aspect of
the standard is tried to be covered which includes request/response examples.
This makes it easier for readers/developers to test protocol specifications that
are written on the documentation and understand it thoroughly by actually
executing them. The reference implementation for the O-MI consists of the
following modules, developed by Aalto University, School of Science.
First considering the O-MI node server. This server holds a database
that maintains all the information regarding O-DF based objects, object,
Infoitems, and their values. This server is enabled to perform all the func-
tionalities, read, write, cancel and subscription. The underlying transport
protocols that are currently utilized are HTTP and web sockets. Any op-
eration of O-MI is transported using HTTP POST request. In most of the
scenarios, reference implementation acts as a simple REST node. However,
not in the case of subscription operation where responses are based on inter-
vals or on events to the list of users who opted for subscription mechanism.
There is also an optional feature of specifying callback URL address. It differs
from that URL which is used by the user to send the request. Callback URL
is defined so that messages are received at this address when the subscription
session is active. If no callback URL is specified then the information can be
polled (as described earlier in 4.3) utilizing a new read request with the ID
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techniques required for various agents are discussed in Chapter 6.
5.2 Reference Implementation Security Model
As all the product developments today require security incorporated in them
against cyber-crimes, in the same way, security of the reference implemen-
tation is equally important. Reference implementation first had only IP
whitelist mechanism for security. With IP whitelisting, trusted IP addresses
or ranges of them are listed with which only trusted users can access the
domain. In case of the reference implementation, IP whitelist was utilized
for “write” functionality whereas “read” functionality was open for everyone.
This method cannot be considered a proper security mechanism in its true
sense. It did not even define access roles for the users/group of users and
their associated rules for using the objects.
Therefore, in order to have a properly defined secure mechanism, a ded-
icated security model was created (which is now considered as version 1 of
the security model). It developed the OAuth/certificate based authentica-
tion mechanism and access management rules based on the O-MI verbs and
O-DF model. However, this version 1 has now become outdated and needs to
be upgraded because of two reasons: 1) It does not provide any kind of sup-
port for O-MI read request permissions, and 2) It consisted of only specific
authentication method implementations. The newer version of the security
model has dealt with the above situation and has provided a better solution
where Authentication and Authorization are separated into two individual
services working together. The details of the Security Model version 2 are
discussed in the following chapter which also compares the newer version
with the older one and defines the new functionalities implemented.
Chapter 6
Security Model for O-MI Proto-
col
6.1 Introduction
In order to utilize O-MI node reference implementation in a practical envi-
ronment, authentication and authorization are the basic functionalities. The
administrators should be able to define policies and roles of all O-MI opera-
tions and object(s)/Infoitems of O-DF.
This chapter first discusses O-MI node security requirements in various
cases and then explains in detail about the design architecture, interaction
schemes and implementation of authentication/authorization modules.
6.2 O-MI Node security requirements
In the Internet of Things, security, privacy, and confidentiality are important
aspects to be careful about. There is a lack of a standardized procedure for
the security and its mechanisms in IoT. It is now an important fundamental
need to define a valid secure system for the IoT environment. The first step
would be to gather all the security requirements in different network scenarios
same as in various use cases.
6.2.1 Network configuration based security
This section focuses on four main network configuration cases where clients/agents
may belong to the same or different networks and interact with the O-MI
node server. Each of these cases confronts a different security threat and has
its specific requirements.
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1. Localhost or machine: In this case, clients/agents are on the same
host as that of the server. The security in such a scenario is considered
trusted as the administrator would only accept the installation of that
software that he believes to be authentic. In such situation, advanced
security procedures such as digital certificates and request/response
encryption/decryption processes are not applicable as they may over-
burden the server unnecessarily. The only security threat that can
harm the server is from outside. A secure mechanism to safeguard the
server is required to avoid the external threats.
2. Unassociated hosts and same subnet: In this case, O-MI node
server and clients/agents are situated in the same subnet, however, on
individual hosts/machines. The communication in the same subnet
between the server and clients are carried out by utilizing the internal
IP addresses. In this way, both parties do not have to go through
the gateways and intermediary machines for the connectivity. Thus,
creating a highly secured closed community. However, there can be
such attacks where a machine in the network can become compromised
by an attacker and that machine start sending the messages to that
attacker or the third parties. Hence, in this case, major cyber threats
can also occur from external potential attacks or from a hacker who
can physically enter a network node.
3. Identical Network and Non-identical subnets: In order to un-
derstand this scenario, the structure of a big organization can be taken
as an example. Big organizations can consist of various departments
having various subnets where all these subnets are connected to a sin-
gle main network of the organization. In this way, all nodes can share
messages or resources by forwarding the requests/queries via gateways
and utilizing the internal proxy machines. In this scenario as well, if
a network is considered secluded from the Internet then requirements
from the previous case set here. Furthermore, the nodes from different
subnets usually do not have much knowledge about each other. Nodes
present in one subnet only generally communicate with the nodes in
another subnet via gateways where there is a possibility that gateways
implement some secure mechanisms. However, there can be security
threats where a hacker can sniff and spoof the information between
the nodes (of different subnets) communication or can also override the
rules. Therefore, it is considered to be the essential part of communi-
cation to have encrypted messages and to incorporate authentication
mechanism in case if there is an even a chance that a node in a subnet
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cannot be trusted completely.
4. Internet (Non-identical networks): Internet consists of a number
of various networks where there can be several subnets and nodes hav-
ing different backgrounds. Such nodes are not very likely to be trusted
and in such condition, machines need to incorporate the maximum
security techniques they can. On the Internet, any node can be consid-
ered as a comprised one or a hacker, that is why clients or agents should
get authenticated by the server and a secured encrypted iteration must
take place between them.
6.2.2 Use-case based security
Not only on the network configuration, security requirements are also crafted
according to the particular use case or scenario. Such use case usually con-
sists of one’s outlook in a specific environment and an individual’s personal
concerns, interests and needs. In the following, different cases are presented
with different levels of security requirements, starting with no secure method-
ologies and ending with the highest security techniques [43].
1. No or zero security requirements: There exist various cases where
data querying and information updating do not need to incorporate
security techniques. For instance, a microwave oven may ask about the
time to heat the bread that was placed inside it. As this information
is not considered to be the sensitive one, utilizing passwords or digital
certificates for such cases would be an extra burden. Similar is the
example of a smart refrigerator that constantly after a defined period
updates the user with the information regarding the expiry time of the
products placed inside it. At first place, this data can also be considered
not be a sensitive one. However, if the house is empty, there would be
no food placed inside the refrigerator and this information can be a
critical data. Generally, there exist many scenarios where no security
is required and if secure mechanisms are added they make the system
more complex, hard to utilize and might subject to issues related to
privacy. There is also a probability that a system may not be used by
people if it asks the user to identify or authenticate himself before use.
However, in the IoT ecosystem, a data to be sensitive or not, assessing
this might not be very straightforward. Hence, for IoT, this “no or zero
security requirement” scenario is seldom used.
2. Encryption of data and integrity check: In applications where
there is a possibility that an attacker can access the stored confidential
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information or messages in between some communication, encryption
of the data and integrity check becomes necessary. Data encryption
also indicates the integrity of the data (however, not vice versa) which
does not allow an external attacker to manipulate the information and
the man-in-the-middle to read the data during communication without
any notice. Today, information encryption and check of integrity can be
performed simply because of the World Wide Web’s widely supported
HTTPS protocol that can be used straightly. This HTTPS protocol is
almost supported by all the web browsers/agents. Even small enter-
prises have the required info for this and are able to set it up in low cost.
As every company only requires to maintain their own certificate, there
is no need for further effort for its management. All client applications
(for instance, web browser) supports HTTPS and this level of security
does not cause any kind of overhead. This also guarantees the identity
of the data provider and also the integrity of the data provided.
3. Authentication of every interacting body: In the last scenario,
HTTPS was utilized for data encryption and integrity. The server can
also use signed digital certificates. These methods would make the
client aware of a server’s correct identity. In such a case, only one of
the two communicating bodies is identified. There can be multiple sit-
uations where both interacting parties need to be authenticated. If the
Internet is considered then authentication of the client is normally per-
formed by entering his user-name and passwords. This is done over an
encrypted medium. Furthermore, there can be a client-side certificate
that can be used for authentication. HTTPS has the ability to assist
this and it is considered a safe option as compared to the passwords
that are usually termed as easy to guess. However, this authentication
method can make the system more complicated and needs exceptional
web server configuration modifications that might be difficult for some
companies to incorporate. Moreover, saving the certificate on a client
and the distribution of it can be a security risk. The usability of certifi-
cates is also not well known as many users do not accept this or simply
ignore it when their browser pops the option of using it up. Thus, as
this kind of authentication procedure involves all communicating bod-
ies on an encrypted medium, this use case scenario is considered more
challenging and demanding as compared to the previous one.
4. Access control: When a user is identified and authenticated by utiliz-
ing one of the techniques discussed above, it is then necessary to have
access policies/restrictions to various data files and documents which a
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user can retrieve. Like in an operating system where the user has per-
missions of particular operations to be performed on directories and
files, similarly various network resources can only be accessed by the
user if he has the specific rights.
In the security module v2, authentication and authorization modules have
been implemented that authenticates the users, manages user and groups
and their policies are defined to access objects. The next sections describe
the requirements for such modules.
6.3 Security model requirements
One of the important requirements of the security model is to implement
the desired features/functionalities without affecting the current O-MI imple-
mentation. That is why it was decided to have a separate security model that
can be plugged into the current implementation. In the security model, two
separate services (authentication and authorization) are introduced which
makes the system more modular and can be changed with other implemen-
tations. All security requirements are formulated as follows:
• O-MI node restrictions: Unauthorized access to the resources are
not allowed. Only the whitelisted consumers/users are given access to
the O-MI node and have the right to perform the assigned functions
over specific data objects. For example, an individual should not be
provided with access controls to that O-MI node that publishes infor-
mation intended for some specific group of users and not open to the
public.
• The type of operation restriction: There are mainly two permis-
sions: 1) read, and 2) write. It should allow only either to read or
write or can be both for particular users. There should be “allow” and
“deny” policies for the read and write operations and they should be
able to be defined for any data object in the O-DF hierarchy.
• Role (Group) based policies: Every user has to be a part of some
groups. The access policies are set for the groups and not for the
individual users. A user can be in one or more groups. If a specific
group is authorized, then a user belongs to it would be granted access
based on his profile i.e., the group to which he is a part of. For example,
a smart heater O-MI node must allow temperature reading for only
those users from a group that is permitted to consume its data.
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• Recursive rules scheme: The policies must be logical and perfectly
detailed. Policies or rules should be inherited from parents to the child
objects (similar to the OS file systems) and should not be vice versa.
• Default rules: There should be a default group that must implement
default policies for any user. The default policies can consist of the
allow/deny rules for the read and write permissions for any data object
in the O-DF hierarchy.
• Authentication procedure: In order to configure rule-based per-
missions, there should be some mechanism to check the user or device
identity that is trying to access the O-MI node. To minimize the server
load, authentication can be performed with the help of the external
services such as OAuth2.
• Policies management console: The administrator of the system
should have a rules management interface (also called an administrator
console in O-MI security model) where access rules of the groups are
defined in a centralized way. The interface should have these function-
alities: a) a display of all users in each group, b) a display of all groups
in O-MI node, c) a display of access control tree for each group, d)
option to change access control tree for each group, e) option to change
data regarding any group (its name or its users), f)Add/Delete users,
and g) Sign up new users.
From the above-mentioned requirements, it is pretty obvious that they are
closely related to the commonly implemented security techniques. This is
because it has been planned to make this security model similar to the well-
known security mechanism of the Unix file system. It is decided to match its
simplicity and effectiveness.
6.4 Design of the security architecture
In the context of the mentioned list of security requirements in the previous
section, it is possible to setup requirement specific technologies, construct
a comprehensive design and determine functionalities to be implemented.
The fundamental approaches used for designing the security architecture are
described as follows:
• Autonomous authentication and authorization: The security
model has two parts: one is the Authentication module and the other
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is the Authorization module. Authentication module manages users
registration and their data. It handles authentication procedure and
sessions. Authorization module has two sub-parts: the first one is the
Access Control module that will process the requests made by users via
O-MI Node and will authorize them. The second one is Administrator
console that will be only accessible by super-user (or administrator). It
will handle the adding of users to the groups and the related policies.
These independent modules promote a modular approach which en-
ables any use-case to integrate its own authentication or authorization
modules.
• Restful management of the permissions: There is a RESTful
method that permits O-MI administrators to add user rules and man-
age access control policies for the node overall. RESTful API must
enable the administrator to (in a secure way) enter new users, remove
or delete existing users and groups and also specify the access permis-
sions.
• New separate database: In order to assure that the requirement
to modify as less as possible the core O-MI node implementation, an
individual new database should be proposed that handles new users and
groups and their relationship. It also related the access policies with
groups. This would have a drawback related to memory consumption
and the performance of the system, however, it makes the whole system
easier to maintain and code modularity is also achieved.
• External OAuth2 provider: In order to authenticate or register a
user using the third party a feature called as external OAuth2 service
provider should be used which includes login option with Facebook.
• OAuth2 provider: The authentication module should also act as
OAuth2 Provider which offers OAuth2 services and capabilities that
enables users to register their client applications on the authentication
module and login with the obtained access tokens.
• LDAP and local authentication: More authentication options like
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and local username/password
based methods can be added to ensure that the system (or authentica-
tion module) is operative in any scenario.
• Certificates Extension: Since the devices in IoT cannot have an
account on Facebook, for the communication with the devices or ma-
chines, digital client-side certificates should be utilized. Certificates
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• O-MI Node: It is a server-side node that links multiple layers together
to interact with O-MI client through O-MI/O-DF standards.
6.5 User Interaction scheme
The security model has been planned to have two separate autonomous sub-
modules: authentication and authorization. Separating the authentication
submodule establishes a modular structure and makes it easier to be modified
into some other implementation platform (for instance, Fiware keyrock iden-
tity manager). Authorization is closely linked with the O-DF structure where
there is a possibility to have partial authorization. In other existing autho-
rization modules, one can either authorize or unauthorize completely with
no middle way condition. In the proposed authorization structure, an ad-
ministrator has the option to set access policies even for objects or Infoitems
under objects, thus a partial authorize/unauthorize is possible. Separating
the authentication and authorization functionalities is also a common prac-
tice in case of bigger systems. This assists in achieving a good control of scale
and a single common security system requirement in the entire organization
is also satisfied.
As it is decided to have two individual submodules of the security model for
the O-MI reference implementation, there has to be an interaction scheme
for each of these. They are described as follows.
6.5.1 Authentication mechanism
Authentication submodule has the responsibility to register and login users,
manage authentication and handle sessions. There are three login options
available for a user for authentication when he visits the O-MI client. These
three options are 1) Local authentication login, 2) Login with Facebook, and
3) Login with LDAP credentials.
1. Local authentication login is a password based login where a user enters
his username and password. The authentication module checks the user
information in its database (in User table) and if it matches then the
user is authenticated. If a user does not have an account then there is
a sign-up form where he can register himself. The administrator also
has an “admin panel” web page where he can register superusers.
2. OAuth2 based registration/authentication interaction scenario can be
seen in figure 6.3. In this scenario, the user first interacts with O-MI
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there should be a trusted software installed and running on the target device.
The other option is to manually add the certificate to the client machine. At
mutual authentication point, when HTTPS connection is formed between the
home gateway and O-MI node, O-MI node also receives the client/consumer
certificate. The certificate is then verified where O-MI node uses its public
key and checks that the certificate is signed by it and finally claims the device
to be authenticated [60].
Now, the consumer’s identity must be stored and its access rights must
also be defined. For this purpose, the consumer’s e-mail address is extracted
from the certificate by the O-MI node and is saved in the database with the
access policies when the consumer/client registers. Upon the access request,
the e-mail is derived from the certificate and the access request is matched
with its allowed/denied paths. In a real-world environment, a device’s serial
number is taken into account rather than the e-mail address as its ID or can
be a globally unique identifier as defined in [34] [60].
6.5.2 Authorization mechanism
Authorization submodule 2 has two parts: 1) Administrator Console, and 2)
Access Control module. When a user is registered in the system, the admin-
istrator has the ability to add him in particular groups, each of them having
their own defined access policies to retrieve specific objects. To perform this,
a user interface was developed which was named as the access management
tool (also known as administrator console)3. It is only accessible by the ad-
ministrator or superuser and handles adding of users to groups and manages
access policies on the database defined in section 6.4. The Access Control
module will process the requests made by users via O-MI Node and will au-
thorize them.
Access management tool: The interface of this tool is very similar to the
one of O-MI node and has some extended features. It can only be accessed
by administrator or superuser. They have the ability to manage user policies
defined with respect to the groups. They can create new groups, change
or remove them and can add or delete users from specific group(s). This
web interface also links the left panel tree hierarchy (defined in the refer-
ence implementation webclient) that retrieves the object(s) presented on the
O-MI node and access rules for all nodes of this O-DF structure are also spec-
ified. The rules are read, read/write, and no-access for every node of the tree.
2Authorization module is collectively developed with Tuomas Kinnunen
3The tool in this version 2 is adapted from [60].
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8. Authorization module will send a response that consists of O-DF paths
i.e., allow and deny (they should be subtracted from the allowed ones)
paths specified for that user/consumer.
9. O-MI node will then filter or process the requests according to the
policies it acquired from Authorization module and will return back
the final result to the O-MI client.
6.6 Implementation of security model
In the previous sections, the design architecture and interaction flows were
described. This section discusses the technologies utilized and implementa-
tion details. The security module is developed using Python and Scala lan-
guages. HTTP frameworks that were utilized in the construction of security
model were Django web framework (for developing authentication module)
and Akka HTTP. It supports SQL databases and LDAP directory services.
Furthermore, JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) are also taken into account.
The new Auth (Authentication and Authorization) API feature utilized
in O-MI node is used for setting up external services for authentication and
authorization. External services refer to the separate processes that have
the ability to run on the same or different device. Overall, the process goes
like this: O-MI node first interacts with the authentication service, then
communicates with the authorization service and finally filters the requests.
Authentication and Authorization APIs possess the feature of adaptabil-
ity and flexibility. There exist configurable options for them which can be
found in the configuration file of O-MI node. However, only the fixed format
is when Authorization service sends a fixed response (as described in step 8
in figure 6.6).
There can be multiple configurable methods to extract the input for au-
thentication service from the original O-MI request. Thus, the authentication
session credentials can be sent in: omiEnvelope attributes, HTTP cookies,
Authorization HTTP header, other HTTP headers, and URL query param-
eters. Utilizing omiEnvelope attribute is the recommended method that es-
tablishes the functionalities even if any other transport protocols are being
used. One such example format of the omiEnvelope attribute is given in
figure 6.7 which also includes a token.
The Authorization service input can also be deduced using the configura-
tions in the same way. Utilizing the original request, values can be extracted.
It is also possible to get them from the response of the earlier request to the
authentication service. If the Authorization service receives a response mes-
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them. Providing the user/consumer ID, this methodology has the ability to
determine the combined/overall permissions.
6.7 Comparison: Security Model v1 and Se-
curity Model v2
This section discusses the main features of security models version 1 and
version 2. It highlights the important aspects and the reasons behind the
decision of implementing the second version.
6.7.1 Recap of Security model version 1
This first version consists of two fundamental parts: 1) Authentication sub-
module, and 2) Access Control submodule. Authentication submodule man-
ages the registration of the new customers/users and their data via external
OAuth2 provider service (for example, Facebook). Furthermore, it handles
authentication procedures and session management. Access Control submod-
ule further divided into two parts: 1) Administrator console, and 2) Access
control middleware. The first one is a tool developed for administrators to
handle users, their groups and associated rules. The later part manages
and authorizes the user access requests. It receives the incoming O-MI re-
quests from the O-MI node server via HTTP to be accepted, rejected or
processed/filtered [60].
6.7.2 Current Security model implementation
There was a need to upgrade the previous security model by providing a
newer version for two reasons. Firstly, the version 1 did not support the read
request permissions for O-MI. Secondly, the implementation was specific to
the selected authentication techniques. The newer version has a new Auth
API (that consists of Authentication and Authorization services) in O-MI
node and new reference implementation for API.
In the newer version, there are separate autonomous Authentication and
Authorization services. More authentication options are provided such as
local authentication, OAuth2-based, LDAP-based and certificate based. Au-
thentication module also behaves as identity manager to authenticate users/
consumers and verify that an authenticated consumer has sent the request.
Furthermore, web technology also supports the separation of services. Hence,
there is a possibility that the entire module for authentication can be replaced
with the already developed identity manager implementations if required.
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Conclusion
7.1 Summary of research
The focal point of this thesis was to create an appropriate security model for
the O-MI protocol. First of all, it introduced the IoT concepts, related chal-
lenges, the need for a unified IoT protocol standard, and security importance.
It discussed the two basic security approaches for a system i.e., authentication
and authorization and described various secure techniques in each approach
with their pros and cons respectively. These included one-time passwords,
context-based authentication, certificate-based authentication, biometric cre-
dentials, multiple single sign-on techniques (SAML, OAuth 2.0 and OpenID)
and LDAP methodology.
Secondly, this thesis highlighted Open Group’s O-MI/O-DF protocol fea-
tures suitable to be known as a standardized protocol. The Open Group’s
vision to create a similar standard approach as that of HTTP for the Internet
was aimed. It discussed the details of O-MI/O-DF standard which included
some important attributes such as subscription feature, independent trans-
port protocol, and support for various message formats. Next, it explained
the reference implementation of this protocol which is currently being uti-
lized and has the ability to incorporate any data of supplier/user scenario.
The basic elements such as web client and O-MI node were described and
related examples were presented. Then the need to secure O-MI/O-DF pro-
tocol was paid attention. Originally, the only IP-whitelisting mechanism was
incorporated. After understanding the requirement of a fully developed secu-
rity model, a detailed secure architecture was developed (known as security
model version 1). Today, this version 1, however, needed to be updated with
the more latest technology available. Therefore, a new security model known
as version 2 was created. It was planned to build an external plug-in security
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model that will provide authentication and authorization capabilities to the
current reference implementation of O-MI/O-DF.
Thirdly, the thesis focuses on the security requirements, designing the
architecture, interaction schemes and implementation details. This part of
the thesis first discussed network based requirements and considered various
use-case based security needs. Two fundamental functionalities were high-
lighted i.e., authentication and authorization. Primary design plans were
formed based on the presented requirements such as database architecture,
access permissions management and authentication methods. Interaction
flows were described for OAuth 2.0, LDAP and certificate-based techniques.
Administrator console and access module functionalities were presented and
finally, a technical comparison with older security model was performed.
7.2 Study Analysis
The aim of this thesis was to develop a suitable and up-to-date security model
for the O-MI/O-DF protocol. Autonomous authentication and authorization
modules are created and it is possible to integrate them with any existing
software system. Multiple authentication options are provided as compared
to the previous version of the security model and fine-grained read permis-
sions are specified. New Auth API (authentication and authorization) is
developed for O-MI node and new reference implementations are considered
for the API. The procedure to apply policies to the groups, users and various
data entities was described, thus providing the way to set rules for real IoT
devices generally. IoT related legal and privacy matters for the exchange of
information were not included in this thesis.
7.3 Future concerns
This thesis concludes that O-MI/O-DF is a proposed unified standard pro-
tocol for IoT ecosystem and the security model of such system is highly
essential that provides safe, reliable and secure communication between the
consumers and devices.
The working of the developed security model has been verified by testing
using the local systems and are further planned to incorporate them in various
use case scenarios. One of the authentication methods was based on digital
certificates and is considered more trusted method as that of conventional
username/password technique. However, the distribution of such certificates
via Internet connections might cause further threats. There is a possibility
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that the producer of a product might incorporate the certificate into the
device even before it is sold and hardware expert may create possibilities that
no one with the possession of the device able to compromise these certificates
or steal them in any way. However, certificates are valid for a specific period
of time and expire after that. Consequently, this requires to update them
on every machine manually which can be up to millions in number. Another
option is to automate the creation and regeneration of client-side certificates.
This can be done by generating a public-private key pair by the client. The
client sends his public key to the server with the certificate request along with
his additional data such as his e-mail address, company name, and location.
A server creates certificates with the client’s public key and sends it to the
client that uses his private key to decrypt it. The server-client connectivity
is protected utilizing HTTPS method. However, this is possible only if the
server trusts that he is talking to the correct person/client.
Today, there can be multiple ways to implement authentication and au-
thorization techniques. This research has put light on the importance of the
latest secure methods that should be incorporated to deal with the rapidly
emerging cyber attacks. This thesis supports the implementation of a unified
IoT standard and security concepts that are independent of use-cases, and
recommend further software systems a useful set of acclaimed authentication
and authorization technologies.
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